“One can win the War, but lose the Peace.” Cliché this may be, but it also a hoary truism that looms over the post-war scenario in Sri Lanka. The triumphant Sri Lankan government now has to address the human terrain rather than the fields of battle.

In facing this challenge both government and concerned people must attend to another truism: as Sinnappah Arasaratnam pointed out long ago, extremist have been feeding off each other and undermining political compromise in Sri Lanka over a long period of time. Now, apart from the well-known Sinhala chauvinist forces outside and within the Rajapaksa government, we must attend to the Tamil chauvinist forces in the TNA and elsewhere in Sri Lanka, in Tamilnadu and in the ranks of the vociferous SL Tamil diaspora across the world. These forces have to be corralled and undermined.

Minister D.E.W. Gunasekera

This is not an easy task. It calls for a multi-stranded strategy involving many moderate forces. One element is already in place: under the initiatives taken by the Ministry of Constitutional Affairs under Dew Gunasekera Tamil has been made a compulsory subject at school in the Sinhala-speaking areas since mid-2007; while proficiency exams have been introduced at various levels of the public service that give incentives to those with bi-lingual capacity. It remains to be seen whether these steps on paper reach deep and become implanted as effective practice.

Government’s Will and Political Reform

As clearly, all observers are wondering if President Rajapaksa’s sweet words will be matched by substantive reforms in the political dispensation which institutionalize devolution and reach out to Sri Lankan Tamil hearts and minds. When some three lakhs of Tamils in the northern Vanni chose in the course of year 2008 to move east with the retreating LTTE forces, they did so because they distrusted the Government and believed the LTTE was their protector. So, President Rajapaksa’s advisors have to ask two related questions. “How was this so?” “And why are the Tamil peoples, including many in the Jaffna Peninsula and in Colombo District, so alienated and distrustful of the present regime (and past regimes)?”

In addressing this issue they must thank the Tigers for their parting ‘gift’. By turning draconian around January 2009 and holding roughly three lakhs of Tamil people in “bondage”, to use DBS Jeyaraj’s term, till they eased constraints on the remnant 50,000 on the 10th May 2009, the LTTE alienated most of these people – sometimes to the point of virulent opposition.

But note, too, that the feeling of bitterness extends beyond the LTTE. “I do not know the purpose of my life. I wonder why and for what the LTTE and military fought the battle and what was achieved in the end. We believe the Tigers, Sri Lanka government and Indian people with whom we share a special bond are all responsible for our fate today,” said one 67-year old named Aryanathan when he was interviewed at Manik Farm Zone IV by a body of foreign journalists (see Muralidhar Reddy article in Hindu, 27 May 2009). Aryanathan spoke in English and presented this view as a distilled statement embodying the views of some 21 IDPs assembled at one spot.

Subject to the caveats encoded within Aryanathan’s statement, the feelings of the Tamil refugees towards the LTTE represent a reality check to the Tamil communalists in Lanka and abroad who are marooned within their very own island of rage and fantasia. The sentiments of such Tamil IDPs are also a potential boon for the government of Sri Lanka. But will the government demolish this opportunity by being too draconian in its treatment of the IDPs in what are effectively internment camps rather than “welfare centres”? Screening the IDPs is certainly called for and de-mining is an essential operation in the war-ravaged terrain of their old villages, but military adjutants who bark orders will undermine the political project of the government. The administrators, whether military or civilian, must be individuals with a humane touch. Their rule must also be transparent and marked by the registration of all IDPs.

While the Tamil IDPs are an immediate issue, the long-term question of constitutional reform cannot be postponed. This is not my field of expertise. The draft 2000 constitution is widely regarded as a good foundation which specialists in Sri Lanka can build on for this purpose.

But from the outside I suggest that these specialists should be ready to (a) think outside the box and go beyond the 13th amendment in the constitutional reforms that are put in statutory place; and to (b) insert some measures of asymmetrical devolution within these plans.

Ongoing Obstacles: Authoritarian Big Men, Anti-Democratic Practices

Suppose, then, that by some work of genius a wonderful new constitutional scheme of power-sharing is worked out and put in place. Will it last? Can it work? I foresee two major problems that will undermine this project, problems that have in fact undermined the working of democratic institutions in Lanka for six decades. In a nutshell these are (A) the overwhelming concentration of power in the President’s office in the De Gaulle constitution set up by J. R. Jayewardene in 1977 with advice from Professor A. J. Wilson; and (B) anti-democratic practices in electoral processes and party organization that are of endemic character. Both these facets are sustained by (C) a set of cultural practices that I have described as the “Asokan Persona” in the course of four essays in Exploring Confrontation (Reading: Harwood and Delhi: Navrang, 1994).

My path to this theory was accidental and began at Peradeniya University in 1970. I had placed an application for research funds in late 1969. Having no response by early 1970, I asked the deputy-registrar why no decision had been taken. Answer: “we could not meet because Professor HA de S. Gunasekera is too busy” (he was electioneering for Mrs Bandaranaike’s ULF alliance). I buttonholed HA de S at the earliest opportunity when no one else was around. He said: “Yes, yes, yes, I will attend to it.” Not easily fobbed off, I utilized his bosom-friendship with Dr. AJ Wilson within his own department to present an alternative pathway: “Why can’t Willie attend in your place?” The immediate and instinctive reaction was” No, no, no. I have to be there.” QED. I had to wait till the year never-ending.

That, in a nutshell, is what I conceptualize as the Asokan Persona. The Big Man (invariably male) has to control every fiddling little thing. My theory therefore highlights a deeply-rooted cultural tendency towards the over-concentration of power at the head of organizations and a failure (if not an ingrained inability) to delegate power.

Apart from generating administrative bottlenecks, such practices sustain a top-down flow of authority in ways that stifle initiative among higher-level and middle-level officers. This strand of interpersonal organizational practice, in turn, is shored up in Asia’s hierarchical context by cultural practices that encourage subordinates to kow-tow (significantly a Chinese word incorporated into English) to superiors in ways that encourage them to think themselves God-Almighty. This tendency is accentuated by standard practices associated with ministers of state at public functions: the ministerial or presidential persona is always pirivaragena, surrounded by an entourage (or preceded by beeping security cars on road). The concept pirivaragena is deeply etched within Sinhalese thinking: images of the Buddha are surrounded by disciples and followers in many temple wall-paintings; and it is known that chiefly journeys in Sinhalese kingdoms past were invariably pirivaragena.

Where such practices pertain to the head of state, that is to President or Prime Minister, the Asokan Persona has one additional ingredient denied to, say, a head of department. At the apex the Persona not only embodies concentrated power with all the force of legitimised authority, but is also vested with the aura of sacredness. In brief, the position combines the roles of Pope and King (or Queen) with an Asian twist. Righteousness envelopes the person and his (her) acts. It follows that challenges from below are likely to be deemed to be unrighteous (or unpatriotic), a form of heresy.

Disturbing Thoughts

One does not need to be a Newton to conclude that what the Sri Lankan President gives as constitutional gift, he can withdraw too. Or his successor can. Ergo, it follows that constitutional transformation must also curtail the existing presidential powers. Is this likely? The short answer is: rivers do not flow backwards. In effect, any scheme of reform is vulnerable and on shifting sand.Bold

Add to this the character of the two main parties: the Sri Lanka Freedom Party and the United National Party. Neither have internal democracy. Worse still, whispers from around suggest that elections in the past decade or so have been widely marked by intimidation, vote-rigging, denial of voting rights by clerical acts and all manner of chicanery. If these tales are valid, once we set them within the context of over-centralized organizational practices of the Asokan type, what we have in Sri Lanka is a form of democracy that is riddled with caverns and dungeons.

A Critical Issue: Part-Whole Relationships

Such concerns aside, many have welcomed the President’s parliamentary address on Tuesday 19th May. His symbolic deployment of a few sentences in Tamil was, indeed, as innovative as welcome. His dismissal of ethnic identity as irrelevant was also applauded widely.

End of the war

This assertion was concomitant with an emphasis on the overwhelming importance of two categories of being in Sri Lanka: those patriotic (ratata adara karana aya) and those unpatriotic (ratata adara nokarana aya). Ratata adara nokarana aya was used in the sense “un-Sri Lankan” – that is, in the manner “un-American” in Yankee-speech. For this reason, it is feasible to interpret the argument in dark ways as a warning to critics of the government.

I prefer, here, to dwell on the benign reading of this viewpoint as a rejection of the pertinence of ethnic identity and thus of ethnic differentiation. But I do so in order to argue that such a contention is beset with pitfalls and lacks substance.

For one the President’s stirring message was (and continues to be) contradicted by popular depictions of the triumphant war as a re-enactment of the Dutugemunu Elara episode in Sri Lanka’s history, a trope now for indelible Sinhala-Tamil conflict. The President himself catered to this understanding by garlanding a statue of Dutugemunu a few days later.

As problematically, at the celebration honouring the war heroes on Friday 22nd May, the President spoke of the jatika kodiya, sinha kodiya (national flag, Sinha flag) in the same breadth. In this critical conceptualization a part of Sri Lanka, the Sinhalese people, is equated with the whole of Lanka. This ideological act of merger is presented in taken-for-granted manner, thus, insidiously and powerfully.

Let me clarify the relationship of part to whole via a comparative excursion that addresses the relationship between the concepts “England” and “Britain” and thus English” and “British”. Let me focus on this issue over the long period 1688 to 1945, a period when the British Empire was built up and sustained.

England was the central force in the regional and institutional complex that came to be known eventually as Great Britain. In the result it was common in the 19th and 20th centuries for English persons to use the terms “English” and “British” as synonyms. I have evidence of General Hay MacDowall (as Scot a name as you can get) doing the same thing unthinkingly as he sat atop Kandy in 1803. Since the Scots and the Welsh benefited immensely from British strength and expansion it would seem that they went along with the taken-for-granted hegemony of England within Britain. Thus, while ‘roaming in the imperial gloaming’ some Scots accepted English dominance – till recent decades when their nationalism has sharpened and taught new generations of English persons not to equate “England” with “Britain”.

General Hay McDowall

I shall return to this facet, the incorporation of whole by part, within the Sinhala mindset at the concluding moment in my essay. But I must also explain why the President’s benign emphasis is impractical and lacking in substance. This calls for an excursion into the foundations of ethnic identity and patriotism, a complex subject that can n only be clarified incompletely in brief comment.

Identity and Patriotism

Endowed with speech and memory, human beings classify the world around them. Vernacular language schemes develop in the course of human interactions with different others in contiguous space. These relationships are inter-subjective and self-referential. Labels define “Us” in distinction from named “Others.” Though boundaries are not watertight and few peoples are totally homogeneous, the transgression of boundaries, say, by boy-girl affairs, sometimes generates an emphasis on the sanctity or worth of a group. Needless to say, the cluster of factors and practices that sustain the boundaries of named groups over an extended period of time can vary from place to place and, in any specific case, can alter over time.

Family and familiar locality is often of central significance in the nourishment of loyalty to group and its associated territorial space. Thus, in most instances a Sri Lankan’s patriotism to his island entity is built upon local experiences and sentimentalities. I conjecture that President Rajapaksa’s Lankan patriotism is founded upon his love for his gama (village) and his pride in being a Ruhunu kollek (a lad from the Ruhunu South). My own profound Sri-Lankanness is built upon deep sentiments around the Fort of Galle, my life-memories around my alma mater, St. Aloysius College, and such beautiful landscapes as Peradeniya Campus and its Hantane Range.

To erase such pillars and familiar roots in any individual’s memory-bank is both impractical and silly. Likewise one must allow for the fact that among many individuals their Sri-Lankan-ness has been generated through their ethnic identity as Burgher, Malay, Sinhalese, Tamil et cetera. In other words, a pyramid of ethnic and other identities can strengthen patriotism and nationalism.

The Sri Lankan cricket team in the 1940s onwards was bolstered by the likes of a Sathasivam, a Heyn or a Coomarawamy. When Sri Lanka faced Tamilnadu (or Madras CA) for the Gopalan Trophy from the early 1950s, the Tamils of Sri Lanka faced up to the “Other” as sturdy “Ceylonese” to a man. The tragedy of Lanka’s history is that so many Sri Lankan Tamil patriots of yesteryear were led (for reasons I cannot tackle here) to discard their Lankan-ness and adopt a separatist Eelam identity or to discard their island roots altogether.

On these solid grounds of sociological theory, therefore, I assert that Sri Lanka today has to recognize that its patriotic identity “Sri Lankan” must be built upon a confederative principle that recognises the existence of several communities as well as three nations within the entity Lanka (Ceylon). The three nations are the Sinhalese, Tamils, and Muslims. The communities are the Malays, Burghers, indigenous Väddas, Colombo Chetties, Borahs, Sindhis, Parsees and Memons.

For this pyramid of loyalties and sentiments to be sustained, it is imperative that the Sinhalese=Sri Lankan equation must be undermined and split asunder (witness the manner in which the English=British equation has disintegrated in the last 40 years). A scheme of constitutional devolution directed by goals of appeasement is obviously vital to such a process. But my argument here points to the vital need for ideological work that seeks to undermine the hegemonic swallowing of the Sri Lankan whole by its Sinhalese part.

This is not an easy task. Constitutional fiat cannot transform minds, especially entrenched mindsets. Categorical subjectivity is a hard nut to crack. Multiple strategies are required. Let me suggest one that is designed to work over two generations.

Briefly, my intent is to develop hyphenated categories of self-identity. By that I mean such labels as “Italian-Australian” and “Greek Australian,” labels that are deployed in Australia both as self-referential terms and as pertinent descriptions of a third persons.

Towards this end I would like to see the process of creating identity cards, driving licenses and census enumeration organized in terms that have it as said that all citizens are “Sri Lankan;” and, within that premise, for the forms to have separate boxes with the following categories for each person to tick (or have ticked): Vädda Lankan, Sinhalese Lankan, Burgher Lankan, Borah Lankan, Sindhi Lankan, Tamil Lankan, Parsee Lankan, Malay Lankan, Colombo-Chetty Lankan and, last but not least, Samkara Lankan (mixed descent).

The latter category is particularly important. For one, it is a step that gives equal place to matrilineal ancestry and thus enhances female rights. For another, it will register the important phenomenon of hybridity that is otherwise lost in the political weight carried by census enumeration. There are a significant number of Sinhalese-Tamil marriages even today, especially in Colombo District and in the low-country plantations districts; taken together with the mixes between other communities, it would not surprise me if the category Samkara amounts to anything between 7 and 10 per cent of the total population of Sri Lanka. If this conjecture is valid, then the Tamils, Muslims, Samkara and other tiny communities will add up to almost thirty per cent of the total population.

But the point of this proposal is not primarily devoted towards marking and assessing relative demographic clout (the census is not politically-neutral). The goal is to reform and transform the categories of self-identity so that hyphenated thought takes root and destroys the insidious incorporation of the whole, Sri Lanka, by the majoritarian dominant part, Sinhalese. My suggestion is quite fundamental. It will call for political imagination for the rulers of the land to accept it.

Singapore, 18 April, (Asiantribune.com): “Sri Lanka has become a living laboratory on how to and how not to fight terrorism. Governments from around the world have started to study the Sri Lankan case. Western and other military, law enforcement security and intelligence services are today consulting the Sri Lankan government on how they reduced the LTTE power from a formidable to a mediocre organization. Sri Lanka provides the best case study of how to dismantle a terrorist group militarily. Sri Lanka still needs to develop its core competencies to fight LTTE’s domestic and foreign support base politically, economically and diplomatically. Until then the conflict will subsist and may even revive, said Prof: Rohan Gunaratna

In an interview with Asian Tribune Prof: Rohan Gunaratna added unfortunately, both Sri Lankans and foreigners lacked an understanding of the LTTE, especially of Prabhakaran – Asia’s master of terror. To educate our friends in the West, Sri Lanka needs to train its diplomats and others concerned on how the LTTE operates in the West. Otherwise, LTTE will hoodwink the international community, the press and others making them behave like LTTE’s agents of influence.

Sri Lankan born Prof. Rohan Gunaratna is the Head of the International Center for Political Violence and Terrorism Research and Professor of Security Studies at the Nanyang Technology University in Singapore. A world authority on Al Qaeda, Professor Gunaratna was a former Senior Fellow at the Combating Terrorism Centre at the United States Military Academy at West Point. Today, he holds several honorary appointments including as Honorary Fellow and Member of the Advisory Council, International Policy Institute for Counter Terrorism, Israel. He holds a masters degree in international peace studies from Notre Dame, US, where he was Hesburgh Scholar and a doctorate in international relations from St Andrews, where he was British Chevening Scholar.

Prof. Gunaratna has over 25 years of academic, policy, and operational experience in counter terrorism. In addition to testifying before the 9/11 Commission, he led the specialist team that designed and built the UN database on the mobility, weapons and finance of Al Qaeda, Taliban and their Entities. He serves on the editorial boards of “Studies in Conflict and Terrorism” and “Terrorism and Political Violence”, the world’s leading journals on terrorism and counter terrorism. He chaired the first International Conference on Terrorist Rehabilitation in Singapore in 2009.

In addition to authoring Inside Al Qaeda, an international bestseller published by Columbia University in New York, Gunaratna wrote several national bestsellers on the Sri Lankan conflict. This include, “Sri Lanka A Lost Revolution?: Inside story of the JVP,” ” Indian Intervention of Sri Lanka: the role of the Indian Intelligence agencies,” “International and Regional Implications of the Sri Lankan Tamil Insurgency,” and “Sri Lanka’s Ethnic Crisis and National Security.” In addition to debriefing several hundred LTTE leaders and members, Gunaratna interviewed the LTTE leader Veupillai Prabhakaran in 1987 for his book “War and Peace in Sri Lanka.”

Leel Pathirana interviews Prof. Rohan Gunaratna exclusively for Asian Tribune:

Asian Tribune: Welcome to Asian Tribune Professor Gunaratna. You have been a keen watcher and an analyst of the LTTE, its methods of warfare and its organizational structure. You have stated in previous occasions that LTTE is a resilient group and is difficult to defeat militarily. How was it now possible for Sri Lankan Forces could wipe out LTTE, within three years?

Prof. Rohan Gunaratna: The LTTE belongs to the most ruthless and cruel class of terrorist groups that engaged in mass fatality and mass casualty attacks. If the LTTE had access to a nuclear, chemical, biological, or radiological weapon, it would use it. Together with Al Qaeda, the Pakistani Taliban, the Lebanese Hezbollah, the LTTE belongs to the “A” team of terrorists.

Nonetheless, the Sri Lankan case study has demonstrated that even a threat group like the LTTE can be militarily defeated. There is no terrorist group in the world like the LTTE that has targeted and killed so many quality leaders. Sri Lanka is the first country in the world to defeat a terrorist group that employed suicide attacks to such an extent. The reason why the Rajapaksa government succeeded and others failed is clear. None of the previous governments had the political will and the military skill to defeat the LTTE. Furthermore, the previous governments had no national plan and a well coordinated strategy to defeat the LTTE.

Asian Tribune: After 27 years of fighting with the LTTE, the major factor is the overwhelming public support for the armed forces and the Police, how do you see these changes?

Prof. Gunaratna: Public support is crucial in the fight against terrorism and insurgency. The Sri Lankan government understood the vital importance of public support for recruitment to the armed forces and the police. Unlike previous governments that had a dual policy of war and peace, the Rajapaksa government generated public support by explaining its position: that is, the government will fight to the end. Government also highlighted its victories. Success generates success. People want to join the winning side. Government also respected those killed, maimed and injured in battle as war heroes. Government also took the right step to work together with Tamils leaders and masses. By building bridges to the Tamils, government criminalized the LTTE by highlighting its atrocities, extortion, and more recently the mass hostage taking orchestrated by Prabhakaran.

AT: Ongoing war is fought on multiple fronts. Ground, sea and air followed by intelligence and the Police support. In which perspective do you see this strategy?

Prof. Gunaratna: The government understood the importance of fighting the LTTE on all its fronts. Towards this, government engaged and locked the LTTE on all its fronts, except the international front that needs to improve. Unlike previous governments, Gotabhaya Rajapaksa, the Secretary of Defence coordinated the armed forces, the police, the intelligence service and other kinetic capabilities. He was ably assisted by the army chief Lt. General Sarath Fonseka, Navy Chief Admiral Wasantha Karannagoda, and the Air Chief Air Marshall Roshan Gunatillake.

They had all suffered from the LTTE: their friends, colleagues and family members were killed. They were highly motivated, dedicated and competent commanders. They had all experienced battle and knew what exactly the ground commanders and troops needed to win. They worked hard, day and night, and every day, supporting the frontline warrior to fight to the end.

AT: For a longtime, the LTTE was a dangerous and ruthless terrorist outfit. But they suddenly collapsed within 3 years. How can these lessons be applied to other terrorist outfits in the world? And will this be a symbolic event for the rest of the world in terms of fighting against terrorism?

Prof. Gunaratna: Sri Lanka has become a living laboratory on how to and how not to fight terrorism. Governments from around the world have started to study the Sri Lankan case. Western and other military, law enforcement security and intelligence services are today consulting the Sri Lankan government on how they reduced the LTTE power from a formidable to a mediocre organization. Sri Lanka provides the best case study of how to dismantle a terrorist group militarily. Sri Lanka still needs to develop its core competencies to fight LTTE’s domestic and foreign support base politically, economically and diplomatically. Until then the conflict will subsist and may even revive.

AT: I remember according to the most of the defense and military analysts, commanders of all three forces emphasizes, that operations for countering LTTE activities should be first started from the North-East, and to be liberated. Subsequently they adopt that strategy and the “Mavil Aru” issue also came at the same time. Thus, the entire North East could be liberated and the civilian’s could be re-settled. Do you think this was a good start?

Prof. Gunaratna:As Sri Lanka is one of the smallest countries in the world, any citizen should be permitted to live anywhere in the country. For fear of the LTTE, over a million Tamils and Muslims live in the south. Similarly, Sinhalese should be permitted to live anywhere in the country. There should be no organized settlement anywhere in the country.

Our aim should be to create a united Sri Lanka and reinforce a Sri Lankan identity. This cannot be done in one generation and through forced settlement. However, if we encourage Tamils, Muslims and Sinhalese to live together in harmony in this generation we will have a Sri Lankan identity in the next generation. To do this we need time to heal, programs to reconcile and visionaries to build bridges between communities and faiths.

AT: After CFA (Cease Fire Agreement) signed on 2002 between the LTTE and the United Front Government led by Mr. Ranil Wickramasinghe, they managed to smuggle large numbers of military hardware. Did they hoodwink the then government or were they aware about the LTTE acquiring the military hardware? Can you elaborate how they strengthened and develop militarily during that interim period?

Prof. Gunaratna: Prabhakaran once told a group of Black Tigers that wanted to recommence operations to be patient. Prabhakaran said that achieving Tamil Eelam was like a journey from Jaffna to Kathiragama. As the journey could not be made without resting in Vavuniya, Anuradhapura, Colombo, and Galle, Prabhakaran equaled these resting places to peace talks. Prabhakaran argued how every period of peace interludes benefited the LTTE. The LTTE recruited domestically and procured globally during all the ceasefires. There were no exceptions. If there is a cessation of hostilities tomorrow, the LTTE will regroup, reorganize and fight back! Many diplomats and international civil servants do not understand the LTTE model of political behavior. They think that Prabhakaran is as sincere as they are. Prabhakaran never does what he says. Prabhakaran is one of the most deceptive terrorist leaders in the world.

Unfortunately, both Sri Lankans and foreigners lacked an understanding of the LTTE especially of Prabhakaran, Asia’s master of terror. To educate our friends in the West, Sri Lanka needs to train its diplomats and others concerned on how the LTTE operates in the West. Otherwise, LTTE will hoodwink the international community, the press and others making them behave like LTTE’s agents of influence.

AT: Vice versa, most of the heavy damages took place to our forces and the materials during Chandrika’s regime. For instance, Mullaitivu Army Base captured by the LTTE and in one night we lost 1526 soldiers, then Poonaryn, Nagasevanthurai Naval base pre-down attack we lost 625 soldiers, Then the Colombo Airport Attack etc., can you describe why these attacks could not be prevented?

Prof. Gunaratna:The security forces and defense ministry was poorly led and staffed during the Chandrika regime. A well intentioned lady, President Chandrika Kumaranatunge appointed people who were loyal to her but utterly incompetent.

Mr.Chandrananda de Silva, a former elections commissioner, who was clueless about military and security matters, was appointed as defense secretary. Appointing Chandrananda as defense secretary was like getting a gynecologist to perform a brain surgery. He had no core competence and made blunder after blunder for which the nation paid heavily. Camp after camp fell, billions of rupees of weaponry and equipment were taken away by the LTTE, and thousands of soldiers, killed, maimed and injured. Based on an assessment by Professor Gerard Chaliand, the foremost French counterinsurgency specialist, I recall Nanda Godage, one of Sri Lanka’s finest ambassadors briefing Chandrananda of the imminent collapse of the Elephant Pass camp. Chandrananda did not understand the subject, so he chose to ignore the threat. After such a monumental defeat, any self respecting defense secretary would have resigned, faced prosecution for neglect of duty or faced firing squad in an African country. Both to the intelligence service and to the armed forces, President Chandrika Kumaratunge also appointed others who could not do their job properly. Both when in government and afterwards, I told her this but she is still under the impression that she had appointed the best.

AT: Turning point of the Intelligence sector can be pointed out, precisely targeting the Head of the LTTE’s political wing, S.P. Tamilselvan, Head of the LTTE military intelligence Col. Charles (Shanmuganathan Ravishankar) killed in Pallamadu, Mannar and destroying massive “Floating Warehouses” (which carried military hardware) in the international waters … How do you see these successive missions?

Prof. Gunaratna: Three principal strategies worked against the LTTE. The strategy of the army adopted by General Fonseka was to fight the LTTE everywhere. It was not a fight for territory but to reduce the military strength of the LTTE. The LTTE made a mistake by pouring in its fighters and resources to challenge the advancing government forces. Once the overconfident LTTE was stretched out and weakened, the military started to dominate strategic stretches of land and close in on the LTTE leadership. The strategy of the navy was to detect and disrupt the flow of weapons and other equipment to the LTTE fighting force. The strategy adopted by Admiral Karannagoda was to go after the LTTE.

Unlike any previous commander, Admiral Karannagoda guided his fleet to go out to the international waters and destroy LTTE ships supplying the killing machine in Sri Lanka. In addition to destroying high value targets, the strategy of the air force was to work closely and support the army and the navy to do their job effectively and efficiently.

AT: Sri Lanka police is playing a major role behind the scene specially stabilizing security in Colombo and suburbs. Arresting and interrogating suspects, acquiring vital information etc., what is your comment?

Prof. Gunaratna: Securing the capital city, the nerve centre of any country, is crucial. Prabhakaran understood the importance of targeting the economic hub and the political centre. Whenever Colombo suffered an attack, it nearly paralyzed the nation. The LTTE successfully penetrated Colombo and maintained between 200-400 spies, operatives and logisticians at any given time. By bombing civilian targets, the LTTE destroyed not only the lives but the dreams of Tamils, Muslims and Sinhalese. They also killed some of Sri Lanka’s best and brightest including the hardworking President Premadasa, the outstanding foreign minister Lakshman Kadiragamar, parliamentarian and a legal scholar Neelan Thirchelvam, and a respected counter terrorism specialist Colonel Thuwan Nizam Muthalif.

As defense secretary, Gotabhaya Rajapaksa forced the different security and intelligence agencies to work together. The recent success to securing Colombo is because the different agencies have started to work collaboratively. Although the threat to Colombo persists, the police and the intelligence services have been able to secure Colombo to a large extent.

The CID, TID and other specialist investigative and intelligence agencies have played a crucial role in dismantling the LTTE infrastructure in the south. Operating under constant threat the leaders and staff of these agencies risked their lives to collect intelligence and arrest LTTE spies, logisticians and operatives. As the true guardians of security of Sri Lanka, these men relentlessly targeted LTTE’s vast support infrastructure that provided recruits, funds, supplies, safe houses, transportation and other material.

This infrastructure recruited from the criminal world and even well to do Sinhalese to work for the LTTE for commercial gain. Long after Prabhakaran has been neutralized, it is essential to secure and protect Colombo from infiltration and attack.

AT: T Can you explain how exceptional Col. Tuwan Nizam Muthalif is?

Prof. Gunaratna:Without exception, there was no one in the Sri Lankan military, law enforcement or the intelligence establishment who knew more about the LTTE than Colonel Muthalif. He built his knowledge of the battlefield and understanding of the LTTE though sheer hard work, dedication and commitment. Highly respected by the Sri Lankan and foreign intelligence community, Colonel Muthalif understood that intelligence was the spearhead of counter terrorism. More than any other officer, he interviewed so many LTTE sympathizers, supporters, members and leaders. After engaging them in dialogue, Colonel Muthalif turned so many LTTE cadres to abandon violence and enter the societal mainstream. He educated, trained and mentored a young generation of intelligence operatives who like him functioned fearlessly. While serving in Jaffna, Batticaloa, Vauniya, and Colombo, he disrupted and dismantled more than 100 terrorist cells planning to kill, maim and injure. Considering the sustained and grave damage inflicted by Col Muthalif to the LTTE, Prabhakaran and Pottu Amman decided to assassinate him. However, the Sri Lankan government failed miserably to protect this invaluable son of Sri Lanka. At the time the LTTE assassinated Col. Muthalif in Colombo, he was commanding officer of the Military Intelligence Corps. The knowledge and understanding built of the LTTE by Col. Muthalif and his team of Tamil, Muslim and Sinhalese officers and soldiers enabled Sri Lanka to achieve this current victory.

AT: In fighting with a Terrorist outfit, new methods should be formed in order to countering them and those strategies should be unconventional if I am not mistaken. Let me ask you, innovation or setting up of the DPU (Deep Penetration Unite) and elite SF (Special Forces) how do you see their missions as a counter Terrorism analyst?

Prof. Gunaratna: Terrorists adapt, evolve and change to survive. When fighting terrorism, the terrorist should become the mentor. Unless government shadows the terrorist, the government cannot win. Unless government forces both in sea and land adopt LTTE technologies, tactics and techniques, the government cannot effectively interlock and engage the enemy. Understanding and adopting the modus operandi of the enemy was crucial for the government to defeat the LTTE. The navy using small boat operations at sea and the army using small team operations on land denied the LTTE the freedom to operate. In terms of expertise and experience, the Sri Lankan naval and land Special Forces units are the best in the world.

AT: Let’s talk little about diplomacy, India trained the LTTE and both lost their head of states Indira Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi to terrorism. War against terrorism has almost come to and end. Before it comes to and end, before restore peace in the areas, before resettling the internally displace civilians, India is pressing about a political solution and sometimes ask for an immediate ceasefire. Is this a prudent approach when the government engages in a decisive moment?

Prof. Gunaratna: India has a huge responsibility to share for spawning and sustaining the Sri Lankan conflict. Although India accuses Pakistan of supporting terrorism, India is guilty of state sponsorship of terrorism in Sri Lanka. The first batch of Tamil Tigers was trained in Establishment 22 in Chakrata, north of Dehra Dun, India’s principal military training facility in Uttara Pradesh. The second batch of Tamil Tigers was trained in Himachal Pradesh. The training was conducted by serving instructors of the Indian government. The remaining seven batches including the batch that included Tenmuli Rajaratnam alias Dhanu who killed Rajiv Gandhi was trained in Tamil Nadu. In addition, the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), India’s foreign intelligence service provided specialist training in another number of states including underwater demolition training in Vishkhapattnam. India’s covert role is meticulously documented in “Indian Intervention in Sri Lanka: The Role of India’s Intelligence Agencies.” If India has any sense of shame and guilt, New Delhi must resolve its domestic issues and not get involved in Sri Lanka again.

Sri Lanka must educate India using its foreign service, information ministry and its politicians. Sri Lanka must post its most able Tamil speaking diplomat to Madras and invest substantially to bring all the important Tamil Nadu politicians to Sri Lanka. This should include politicians in the opposition including those corrupt and poorly educated politicians who are in the payroll of the LTTE. Many Tamil Nadu politicians believe that the Sri Lankan government is engaged in atrocities similar to what the Indian military committed in Kashmir or the northeast.

AT: The LTTE’s international chief procurement man Selvarasa Padmanadan alias Kumaran Padmanadan (KP) was listed wanted by the Interpol. But he is freely traveling, isn’t he? Then what is the role of the Interpol?

Prof. Gunaratna: To quote a LTTE leader in the U.K. that fought with KP, “It is KP that made everything possible.” Until KP is alive, LTTE will remain a formidable threat and Sri Lanka will be under threat. For crimes, KP should be arrested and tried. Sri Lanka must not rely on Interpol to arrest KP.

Working with the Thai authorities, Sri Lanka must initiate its own operation. More than ever before arresting KP has become a national security priority. The principal function of the foreign service of Sri Lanka should be to advance its national security and foreign policy goals. The Sri Lankan foreign minister and the head of the Sri Lankan intelligence service must visit Thailand and remain in Bangkok until KP is arrested and handed over to Sri Lanka. If this cannot be accomplished in the next few weeks, government should request for US assistance and the US has significant influence over the Thai military. KP has cultivated Thais ranging from politicians to military generals and businessman.

AT: Did Tsunami became a blessing for them, in order to get many foreign expertise to assist their arms manufacturing plants?

Prof. Gunaratna: As a group with a presence on the coast, when the Tsunami hit, the. LTTE lost a few hundred cadres and lost a dozen attack craft. Nonetheless, the LTTE benefited greatly from the Tsunami funds. Unfortunately, the Western nations from Norway to Canada and Australia were taken for a ride. These well meaning nationals and their nations contributed appreciably to the LTTE. With the help of funds raised in these countries, the LTTE improved the efficacy of its killing machine. Through the Tamil Rehabilitation organization, the LTTE channeled millions of dollars to modernize the LTTE land, air and maritime forces.

AT: Sri Lankan internal separatist conflict and it’s bloodshed over innocent civilians Sinhalese, Tamils and Muslims has been a very “lucrative business” to the NGO’s, and their affiliated Agents in Colombo, they wanted terrorism to be prevailed, what is your comment?

Prof. Gunaratna: It is true that the Sri Lankan conflict produced a group of entrepreneurs whose heart is not in ending the conflict. But it is a very small group and they must not be confused with the larger NGO community in Colombo that has rendered yeoman service. They must now look towards the future of Sri Lanka especially how they can contribute in a post-Prabhakaran scenario to develop Sri Lanka into a first world country. We have all the indicators present in a first world country from literacy to resources. With international governmental and non governmental funding, we must create employment, economic opportunities, and build a state of the art utilities infrastructure in the northeast.

We must bring the economic status of the northeast to the standard of the southwest. We must repeat the Malaysian success and build roads linking the northeast to the rest of the country. We must build a superhighway linking the north and the south. Without working with all the partners, Sri Lanka will fail to make the country a first world nation.

AT: Most of the International organizations including the UN are creating a civilian catastrophe in order to avoid the capture of the LTTE leadership. How a Ceasefire will lead to release civilians as they have been keeping them hostage by the LTTE?

Prof. Gunaratna: The Sri Lankan government should move fast to kill or capture the LTTE leadership. The operation to capture or kill Prabhakaran, a proclaimed offender in Rajiv Gandhi murder, is a matter for the Sri Lankan state. Like Hitlar, Pol Pot, and Osama Bin Laden, Prabhakaran is a mass murderer. Neither the UN nor Norway has a say in it. Both the UN and Norway has failed miserably in mediating or facilitating the Sri Lankan conflict. In many ways, their failure to understand the conflict has created a potential humanitarian crisis.

As the LTTE will try to use its network overseas to revive the LTTE in Sri Lanka, the government needs to reach out to the international community. There should be recognition that the LTTE is an international terrorist group. Although the LTTE kills in Sri Lanka, its network is global. As such, the foreign ministry of Sri Lanka has a major responsibility to formally and informally educate foreign governments, international organizations and others that have an international voice. After Minister Kadiragamar was assassinated, the Sri Lankan Foreign Service has failed to play the required role to keep world leaders, opinion makers, the diplomatic missions, international bodies, and the foreign media updated. Like the military, the foreign ministry should be proactive – before the threat develops, it must preemptively neutralize it.

It is very clear that Prabhakaran has engineered a humanitarian crisis to save himself and the LTTE. It is also clear that the LTTE is behind all the demonstrations from Canada to London to Sydney. However, only a few heads of missions and staff in the Foreign Service are capable of communicating this message effectively to foreign governments and other interested parties. They require training and education. Towards this, a proper Foreign Service school and a well staffed and resourced counter terrorism division should be established. Furthermore, an ambassador for counter terrorism should be appointed.

AT: Did Karuna’s (Ex-Eastern rebel commander) split become a blow to them?

Prof. Gunaratna: The LTTE could never have been defeated if not for Karuna’s decision to leave the LTTE. The government should encourage more Tamils in the LTTE to defect. As LTTE is a conscript and not a volunteer group any longer, government should offer an amnesty to LTTE leaders and members. Except for Prahakaran, Pottu Amman and others who have committed serious crimes, every member of the LTTE should be entitled for an amnesty.

Karuna’s decision to leave the LTTE was very timely. Prabhakaran depended so much on the East for recruits and resources. With Karuna realizing that Prabhakaran was not fighting for the Tamils but for himself and his group, Karuna decided to bid farewell to the LTTE. Both Karuna and his men tasted freedom during the talks and he never wanted to return to the jungles permanently. Although the intelligence community and the military worked well with Karuna, Ranil Wickramasinghe was responsible for opening the eyes of Karuna.

Karuna and leaders like him can play a crucial role in developing a rehabilitation program for former combatants. A leader like Karuna, Pilliyan and Douglas Devanda can kill the avowed vision of Prabhakaran to create an independent Tamil state. Long after Prabhakaran, both in Sri Lanka and overseas, a segment of the Tamils will still believe in an independent Tamil homeland. These mainstream Tamil leaders can politically, socially and economically play a role to empower the Tamils, and integrate them to the rest of the country, and make them think and act like Sri Lankans.

AT: What will be the future of the LTTE? What Tamil Diaspora will do? Still they can finance them, can’t they?

Prof. Gunaratna: If the current degree of pressure can be maintain in the next one and a half to two years, the LTTE can be dismantled completely. The LTTE international network will survive for about a year after the LTTE domestic network has been crippled. With the seizure of LTTE computers in Vishwamadu, the government is in possession of names and details of those who work and support the LTTE network overseas. Working with foreign governments, Sri Lanka should help foreign governments to investigate and prosecute those who support the LTTE.

Belatedly, both the Indian and Sri Lankan Tamils are realizing that Prabhakaran has inflicted untold pain and suffering on an entire generation of Tamils. As predicted by Thangathurai , the leader of the original TELO, if Prabhakaran assumes leadership of the Tamil national movement, Prabhakaran would sacrifice the entire Tamil community. Sending Tamils to their death in the guise of saving the Tamil community by Prabhakaran has been prevented. Leaders such as Minister Douglas Devananda, Minister Karuna, and other Tamil leaders have stepped forward to formally and informally explain the ruthlessness and cruelty of Prabhakaran. For sustained peace, it is paramount for the government to invest even more in shaping public opinion against violence.

Without public support no insurgency can be won. After the LTTE assassinated Rajiv Gandhi, Prabhakaran miscalculated the public opinion of the Tamils. The Tamils are a smart community of people. They knew that the LTTE and Prabhakaran could never create an independent Tamil state. A segment of the Tamil community that hitherto supported the LTTE has today abandoned Prabhakaran. They perceive Prabhakaran as a looser and the LTTE as an unwise investment.

However, there is a group of Tamils that live overseas that have a romantic notion of the LTTE and of Tamil Eelam. They have been exposed to high doses of terrorist and extremist propaganda, some false and others partly true. Living in foreign countries make a segment of the Diaspora should hark back and look at the LTTE as if it is going to solve all their problems.

AT: April 05th is a historical day in Sri Lanka as the rise of JVP insurgency which subsequently led to a debacle, and last April 05th the LTTE encountered their major debacle at east of Puthukudirippu loosing their most senior commanders together with 520 cadres in a single incident, how do you see this, are they are really weak?

Prof. Gunaratna: In the recent offensive operations by the LTTE as well in LTTE counter attacks, the LTTE has suffered not only middle level leaders but commanders with long battle experience. They include Theepan, LTTE Battle Commander, Vidusha, Commander of women’s wing and Dugha, Deputy Commander of the women’s wing and Gaddafi, Commander of the Black Tigers and the bodyguard unit. These developments demonstrate that the LTTE is desperate for quality leaders to lead its fighters in battle. With the LTTE suffering heavy fatalities and casualties, most of the fighters are newly minted. These inexperienced and poorly motivated fighters are no match for a battle hardened and well equipped Sri Lankan military. The LTTE is forcibly recruiting from a population that is no longer willing to support the LTTE. With no experienced commanders to lead, LTTE’s ability to resist will diminish day by day leading to a military defeat of the LTTE.

In his attempt to survive, Prabhakaran ordered the LTTE to take a 100,000 civilians hostage. Today, pockets of civilians are resisting and revolting against the LTTE. This is despite the LTTE has brutally suppressed any expression by the civilians. The LTTE has also shot dead and detained civilians speaking out against the LTTE. The desire to survive from the LTTE has made the civilians attempt to escape against LTTE instructions that they will be shot.

When the LTTE attempted to prevent civilians fleeing, some brave civilians grabbed the weapons from the LTTE members and fled. Many LTTE members did not resist the civilians as they are demoralized. As there are many LTTE members that are keen to desert, it is essential for government to constantly announce its package to any LTTE member abandoning the LTTE.

(a) Safety and security for the cadre and the family

(b) A job and

(c) An amnesty.

AT: Finally, let me ask you. A war against Terrorism can not be fought for the forces itself, if there’s no political leadership behind them. President Mahinda Rajapaksa is the commander-in-chief and Mr. Gotabhaya Rajapaksa is the secretary of Defense, public security law and Order. How do you see their leadership?

Prof. Gunaratna: The best appointment Mahinda Rajapaksa made as President was to appoint his own brother Gotabhaya Rajapaksa as Defense Secretary. I am against appointing relatives and friends but in this case, Gotabhaya was the ideal man for the job. I have known Gotabhaya since he was a young Colonel in the frontline fighting against the LTTE. Gotabhaya has the vision and the mission. It is not the president but the defense secretary that is the number one target of the LTTE. He knows that one day he will be eliminated by the LTTE: yet, he is uncompromising in his service to his country and to his people.

While his brother Gotabhaya Rajapaksa is focusing on securing Sri Lanka, the President has three major challenges. First, he must develop a master plan to economically develop the country especially the northeast. As the first President of a country free of terrorism, President Rajapaksa, should focus on developing Sri Lanka into a first world country. To inject new life to the country, he must tap into Sri Lanka’s most untapped resource – the expatriate community. The roads in Colombo are third rate worse than a very poor country in Africa. The airport needs to be upgraded and a pianist to welcome the arrivals. The amazing wildlife sanctuaries should charge both locals and foreigners a market rate. Second, he must institute good governance. He must prosecute his corrupt and sack his incompetent ministers and civil servants immediately. Third, he must make the Sinhalese, Tamils, Muslims and Burghurs think and act Sri Lankan. Sri Lanka belongs to all its inhabitants. If a minority of the misguided Sinhalese claim that Sri Lanka belongs to the Sinhalese, then the Tamils will claim the north and Muslims the east. As the majority, the Sinhalese must be more generous to its minorities. Today, any majority community will be respected by the way it treats its minorities.

Misguided nationalists both Sinhalese and Tamils have nearly destroyed this country. Religion, language and caste are very private and they must never be used to build political strength. We all have an obligation to build the broken bridges between the different communities. We must treat all communities the same way. We must be very careful of ethnic and religious entrepreneurs that seek to divide people on the basis of their ethnicity or faith.

They are scoundrels that must be rehabilitated. If the government gives way to the ultra Sinhala nationalists, who advocate the Tamils as second class citizens, we will never have a united Sri Lanka. The same way, the Rajapaksa government has defeated the armed Tamil nationalists, Mahinda Rajapaksa has to use his Sinhala credentials to contain ultra Sinhala nationalism and build a truly united Sri Lanka. Building a united Sri Lanka where every ethnic and religious community can live in harmony should become his legacy. Otherwise, a segment of Tamils will cling on to the legacy of Prabhakaran. Within his term of office, the President should build a visionary plan and work towards making Sri Lanka the most developed country in South Asia.

Professor Rohan Gunaratna, Head of the International Center for Political Violence, Terrorism Research and security Studies Nanyang Technology University in Singapore.

Source: Asian Tribune

PRABAKARAN IS SEEN AS A MEGALOMANIAC WHO HIJACKED THE GRIEVANCES OF THE TAMILS TO GRATIFY HIMSELF. THE SWITCH FROM GUERRILLA TO CONVENTIONAL WARFARE WAS DISASTROUS

THE TAMIL ‘STATE’
Prabakaran’s moment of triumph in ejecting the IPKF (March 1990) out of his domain, powered him with greater confidence. He felt vindicated in his belief that Eelam was a reality within his grasp. His surviving boys had gained invaluable experience during the thirty months of ‘vanquishing the fourth-largest army in the world’; the girls had proved their worth and were now battle-hardened; recruiting was never easier, his stock with his donors, the Tamil diaspora, was at its peak; and the media doted on him as their new darling.

It was at this point that he tightened the security around him and set about the task of constructing a state within a state. He reintroduced taxation on his population, decreed the LTTE flag as the Tamil national flag, set up courts, police stations and ‘ministries’ that oversaw agriculture, education, rehabilitation and economic development. But his main preoccupation was in developing a conventional armed force. Military traditions — a formal ranking system, uniforms, gun salutes, parades, ceremonial funerals of flagdraped cadres killed in action — became the norm. Sarongs and flip-flops gave way to smartly pressed uniforms and spit-andpolish boots. Twenty years before he acquired the half-a-dozen ZLIN-143 aircraft to boast of being the only terrorist group in the world to possess an air wing, I was led to the LTTE’s “ordnance factory” in Manipay in 1985 to witness and photograph the aircraft his “aeronautical engineers” were assembling. The fact that it had a 200cc motorcycle engine to power it did not mask his intent to attempt building a conventional Armed Force, with its land, air and sea wings. “Geographically”, he stressed at the very beginning, “the security of Tamil Eelam is interlinked with that of its seas.”
He then turned against his benefactor, the Sri Lankan president, Ranasinghe. Premadasa, who had colluded with him to evict the IPKF and kept him on his toes until Prabakaran had him killed by a suicide bomber three years later in1993.

THE DIASPORA
In his annual Heroes Day speech — that he delivers a day after his birthday — Prabakaran, in November 2006 made his first direct appeal to the diaspora in funding the ‘Final War’ he had launched in July after the European Union joined a growing list of countries that had proscribed the group. Funds were drying up. “We express our gratitude to the Tamil Diaspora, our displaced brethren living all around the world, for their contribution to our struggle and ask them to maintain their unwavering participation and support.” This was in marked contrast to rebuking them for being “quitters” and “losers” in the late 1980s. Donations, however, have not always been voluntary.

Female Black Tigers

Following the crackdown on the LTTE by Canada and The European Union in 2006, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police released a report on their 4-year investigation (Operation Osaluki) into the Canadian fundraising efforts of the Tamil Tigers. The report revealed that the LTTE subjects Sri Lankan Tamils living in Canada and other Western countries to intimidation, extortion and even violence to ensure a steady flow of funds for its operations.
COSTLY MISTAKE
When Rajiv Gandhi was on the political comeback trail in May 1991, Prabakaran wasted no time in executing a pre-emptive strike. He dispatched his homegrown poet, Kasi Anandan — who had only a year ago thrilled the victorious LTTE cadres at a gathering in Trincomalee with his description of the IPKF as the Italian-Parsi Killing Force — to lull any apprehensions that anyone might have about the former Prime Minister’s security. The ruse, clearly, worked.
Except that Prabakaran’s fool-proof plan did not count on having his photographer killed with the evidence against him intact on his body. The murder of Rajiv Gandhi by the world’s first woman suicide bomber set in motion a process that has finally come to destroy his ambition. India proscribed the group and though it took the United States six years to follow the lead and the 9/11 attacks to give the proscription some teeth, the new security climate induced other passive supporters of the LTTE in Western capitals to ban the outfit in their countries.
With international opinion against him, Prabakaran retreated into his hideouts, eased himself out of the media spotlight, only granting even rarer access to international media to lamely deny any hand in his dastardly act. He now began wearing the black thread of his cyanide vial outside his shirt in an ostentatious display of his commitment to the cause. The holster with his pistol now found place outside his camouflage shirt signaling that he was no more ‘Thambi’ (younger brother) or ‘Anna’ (elder brother) to his followers nor merely the National Leader of Tamil Eelam but the Supreme Commander of the LTTE.
The recently released photographs from the treasure trove of albums that the Sri Lankan troops found in the fleeing Prabakaran’s house are very instructive. The black string holding the vial of cyanide has disappeared in a number of images where he is with his family. Neither is his son, equally portly, seen to be wearing one even with his combat fatigues.

HUMAN SHIELDS
From the very beginning it was apparent that he would make ‘people’ his buzz word. First, declare he was on the path he had chosen for their sake, to liberate them. Second, attack the enemy over the shoulders of civilians to provoke an enraged counterattack that would kill innocents and garner him publicity at low cost. Finally, shield himself from attacks by closing all their exits at the point of his guns.
The bulk of LTTE’s attacks against the IPKF were initiated around the core strategy of using civilians as shields. The IPKF helicopter gunship attack in Chavakachcheri was one such classic example. The LTTE positioned its gunmen in the most crowded part of the town — the market — to fire provocatively in the directions of the choppers that were flying at a safe distance from ground fire. At the Chavakachcheri morgue where families of victims were hurling anti-Indian abuses at me, a middle-aged woman took me aside. Apologising for the hostility of the mourners, she muttered, “Hitler killed not his own people, but Jews. But Prabakaran is killing Tamil people.” Civilians as human shields clearly appears to be a central part of Prabakaran’s strategy to escape from his present entrapment.

FOR SOMEONE WHO PIONEERED THE USE – AND MASTERMINDED REMARKABLE INNOVATIONS – OF SUICIDE BOMBERS, PRABAKARAN’S BLACK TIGERS SEEM TO HAVE REACHED A DEAD-END

THE DESCENT
How then did an insurgency, that seized legitimate political grievances as a foundation for terrorism and sustained martyrdom by quasi-religious zealotry, fail in its objective?
From being credited as the world’s most successful and ruthless terrorist to losing nearly all of 15,000 sq.kms of territory in two years requires some doing. Both Prabakaran and the government of Sri Lanka have had their turns grabbing and then losing territory.
In July 2001, marking the anniversary of Black July of 1983, Prabakaran staged stunning attacks on the Sri Lankan Air Force base and the Bandaranaike International Airport in Colombo, wiping out half the country’s civil aviation fleet, in addition to a few military aircraft. With Sri Lanka’s army in a deadlock, the navy restrained and the air fleet neutralized, the success of this attack, once again, placed Prabakaran at the upper end of the plank that Colombo and he had been see-sawing upon for two decades.
Barely two months later, the planes that brought the twin towers crashing down in New York on September 9, laid the ground for the emergence of a new world order where the world was divided into the good guys rooting for a global war on terrorism and the bad guys who attacked governments in pursuit of their evil goals. The seed was thus sown for Prabakaran’s decline and the slow destruction of Eelam. He was beginning to get undone by an event thousands of miles away and over which he had no control.
It was not that Prabakaran did not attempt to adapt to the new world order. To shift the spotlight away from himself, he declared a ceasefire, came out of hiding, without his moustache and his falling hair dyed brilliantly black, sued for peace under Norwegian facilitation and announced his first press conference in a dozen years. His many websites removed all material that would be deemed offensive (virtual training camps where one could learn to forge a passport or make a bomb, for example) in the new environment, and wore safari suits to mould himself in the image of Nelson Mandela, the statesman he was quoting profusely on his sites and in his conversations.
His first and only international press conference (April 2002) at his administrative headquarters in Killinochchi was a disaster. His experience with the media, confined to a few one-on-one interviews with select journalists, had not prepared him for this. He seemed bewildered and clearly out of his depth facing a mixed pack of journalists whose two-day uncomfortable wait was alleviated only by the non-stop screening of LTTE propaganda videos. His image makeover, as a clean-shaven, safari-suited statesman, failed to impress anyone. Announcing his idea of peace involving the Norwegians as peacemakers, he first fumbled and then chose the safer option of avoiding all questions — mostly related to the murder of Rajiv Gandhi and his own demand for a separate state – and passed on the microphone to his interpreter Balasingham. Balasingham declared that his leader was the President and Prime Minister of Tamil Eelam and that he and Mr Prabakaran were the “same” and that he was the LTTE leader’s “voice.” This set the tone for what was to follow.
After six rounds of talks for peace between September 2002 to March 2003 across four countries, Prabakaran was back to what he had perfected over the years since the Thimpu talks in 1985 — stonewall, provoke and renege on an agreement and fully lay the blame for the breakdown of talks on the other party.

SHOULD PRABAKARAN BE FORCED TO FEED ON CYANIDE, IT WOULD MEAN THE DESTRUCTION OF HIS FANTASY AND THE ORGANISATION HE HAS SO BRUTALLY CULTIVATED AROUND HIMSELF

The from-the-very-beginning futile exercise took its toll on three of the four LTTE delegates. Balasingham, the “chief negotiator” was gravely ill and had to remain in Europe along with Adele for his prolonged treatment. Karuna Amman (Vinayagamoorthy Muralitharan), Prabakaran’s commander in the East, was being wooed by peacemakers to part ways with his leader. Meanwhile, the global war on terrorism was increasingly being read as the global war on Islamic terror, which meant the international community was too preoccupied to bother about non- Islamic outfits like the LTTE.
The CFA (Ceasefire Agreement) went into cold limbo. Skirmishes broke out and violations of the agreement accumulated. The Scandinavian countries comprising the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission recorded 3,830 violations by the LTTE against 351 by the Government of Sri Lanka between 20 February 2002 and 30 April 2007.
In March 2004, Prabakaran tried averting the crisis he saw coming his way by summoning Karuna to Jaffna on an official pretext. Karuna had learnt his lessons from the Mahathaya experience. He ignored the summons and split the seemingly monolithic outfit, taking with him a big chunk of the battle-hardened fighters he had trained. With the East in turmoil, Prabakaran saw his Eelam beginning to shrink. Months later, the tsunami further breached the LTTE’s wall of impregnability, damaging its bases along the northeastern coast.
Chandrika Kumaratunga, then heading the government after having survived a suicide bomber attack, quickly learnt from Prabakaran’s successful diplomatic offensives. She dispatched her Tamil Foreign Minister, Lakshman Kadirgamar, to world capitals on a mission to get the international community to act against the LTTE’s interests in their respective countries. Kadirgamar was beginning to notch up diplomatic successes, having got the United Kingdom to proscribe the group in 2001. He was killed by a LTTE sniper in August 2005 just when he seemed on the verge of getting some more countries to proscribe the group.
And when the elections came the following year (2005), Prabakaran compounded his earlier mistakes. He ensured — by forbidding Tamils to cast their vote — the victory of somebody who, he believed, was yet another politician even more infirm of purpose than his predecessors and therefore of immense value to his plans, little realising that he would finally be meeting his nemesis in the Rajapakse administration. Peace is inimical to Prabakaran’s existence. The new government started office, as all new governments in Colombo were wont to do, with a call for peace. After one round of ceasefire talks in 2006, Prabakaran was back to business. His woes of the three previous years in his new avatar of ‘statesmanpolitician’ were proving to him that he just was not cut out to be a man of peace.
In his 2006 November annual speech, after his attempts to assassinate the Chief of the Army and the Secretary of Defence in Colombo, he rued, “We postponed our plan to advance our freedom struggle twice to give even more chances to the peace efforts, once when the tsunami disaster struck and again when President Rajapakse was elected.”
He set out to reassert his authority over the East — and faced an army that was well-armed and well-trained and motivated as never before and one that was working with unprecedented intelligence provided by his breakaway commander, Karuna. Prabakaran lost the East — and from there on, he lorded over an unending series of military defeats.
From among the many reasons being attributed to his incredulously rapid downfall, the one that would without any trouble resonate with those who have dealt with Prabakaran would be his sense of supreme self-importance. He is seen as a megalomaniac who hijacked the legitimate grievances of the Tamils to gratify his vision of himself and failed to see that the switch from guerilla band to conventional army would be disastrous.
For the sanguinary among us — the chief reason for his downfall was the failure of his legendary Black Tiger suicide bombers and his celebrated Intelligence chief, Pottu Amman.
For someone who pioneered the use — and masterminded remarkable innovations — of suicide bombers, Prabakaran’s Black Tigers seemed to have reached a dead-end. President Chandrika Kumaratunga was the first miracle of the Eelam war — as the first ever survivor of a Black Tiger attack, at an election rally in December 1999.
Then came the failures in 2006 that cost him everything — General Sarath Fonseka, Commander of the Sri Lanka Army became the second survivor of a suicide attack in April. Prabakaran’s trusted tool of political persuasion, the Black Tiger, was beginning to let him down. And when Gotabaya Rajapkse, the Secretary of the Defence and the brother of the President escaped a suicide attack in December, it was curtains for Prabakaran. The last two failures led to his destruction. Clearly, Prabakaran was facing a short supply of efficient Black Tigers. He was desperate enough to use recruits whose mental aptitude didn’t match their ferocious commitment. A woman bomber sent to kill the Tamil Cabinet Minister, Douglas Devananda, in his Colombo office in November 2007, triggered her bra bomb when she discovered her target was not available for the day, killing herself and the Minister’s secretary.

MEETING HIS MATCH
The other factor that led to his precipitous defeat is that Prabakaran did not count on the troika (the President, the Army Chief and the Defence Secretary) calling his bluff. His elaborate deceptions of invincibility had begun cracking — first, with the exit of Karuna and then by the steady inroads that the specially trained units of the Sri Lankan Army’s commandos were making. The chronic political oneupmanship in Colombo over the Eelam war between the two national parties — the UNP and the SLFP — which had contributed largely to the growth of the LTTE and the prolongation of the war, was contained by the Rajapakse administration. The Rajapakse brothers pulled out a page from the Bush counter-terrorism doctrine — niceties be damned.
With international assistance — material and moral — for the war on terror pouring in from China, Pakistan and the US, the defence budget was increased dramatically; state of the art equipment procured, and counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency training enhanced. By mid-2006, Canada and the European Union joined the growing list of countries proscribing the LTTE. This clogged Prabakaran’s supply lines and fund collection and contributed to diminishing his ability to fight back the surge of a newly professionalised force. In the Rajapakse brothers, Prabakaran finally met with an enemy as ruthless and unswervingly committed in their goal as he.
As he presides over the destruction of his dream, Prabakaran must already be plotting his next move even as he plans his escape from the ever-shrinking space he is left with to hide in. Staying alive, going back to the basics and brushing up on Sun Tzu. His financially formidable supporters among the diaspora will be told that it is only territory that has been lost and as long as they are behind him he will deliver unto them the dream he has been promising them. Until then, Eelam will, like Khalistan, continue to live on in the virtual world.
His long-term objective, however, will be to foil every effort made by Colombo to redress Tamil grievances and also ensure that he, and only he, remains the sole leader of the Tamils. No moderate Tamil leader or group will be allowed to take his place. Any attempt to nurture a new leadership will be foiled by assassinations and acts of terror — just as he had, in the mid-80s, done the biggest disservice to the Tamil cause by systematically wiping out the leaders of the other militant Tamil groups that existed and decimating their organisations in a move to emerge as the sole representative of the Tamil cause. Elections will be prevented by violence. Prabakaran will patiently wait for complacency on Colombo’s part and any ensuing security lapses to stage devastating acts of terror. In essence, he will start all over again and could potentially claw his way back if allowed to.
The key to ensuring that Prabakaran goes down the same road and fades away as Idi Amin did lies in the sincerity, determination and tenacity of the Rajapakse government (and every other that follows it). Rolling back every discriminatory law and practice against the Tamils and guaranteeing them equal rights and opportunities would need to be its first priority. Ignoring the Tamil diaspora, however much it may rankle, would not be beneficial for Colombo. Colombo only has to remember that the rise and dominance of Prabakaran was largely dependent on Colombo’s policies and attitudes.

PRABAKARAN WILL PATIENTLY WAIT FOR A SLIP ON COLOMBO’S PART AND ANY ENSUING SECURITY LAPSES TO STAGE COUNTER-ATTACKS. HE COULD POTENTIALLY CLAW HIS WAY BACK

IF ALLOWED
As an immediate goal, Prabakaran will be counting on the few Black Tigers lurking in Colombo to blow up at least one of the troika. This would give him a respite, however brief, and save him from biting into the vial he sometimes carries around his neck.
And should he be forced to feed on the cyanide, it would mean the absolute destruction of his fantasy and the organisation he has so brutally cultivated around himself. His death would splinter the group, leaving his surviving lieutenants scrambling for the throne and the vast financial empire Prabakaran has industriously built across three score countries. His son and heir apparent, Charles Anthony, is not considered a serious contender for the top job.
In this hour of unprecedented defeat, the bluster and the belief in his personal immortality will not have dimmed. I wonder if Prabakaran’s hand shake has changed. For an answer to that, over to the friendly Arakan rebel in Myanmar or the sympathetic politician in Europe, whose extended hand welcomes Prabakaranashore as he searches for a sanctuary. In all likelihood, Prabakaran — with all his chips down—would impress his saviour with a firm, masculine shake of the hand.

The author is a former photo-journalist, currently teaching media and international relations at NTU, Singapore

Source – www.tehelka.com

Prabakaran had everything: territory, international support and committed fighters. Senior journalist SHYAM TEKWANI, who has covered the LTTE and Sri Lanka for almost three decades tracks the alarming rise and astonishing fall of a man who sought to live to fight another day, but found only death at the hands of his nemesis.

Velupillai Prabakaran

MORE VIVIDLY THAN anything that came afterwards in the Sri Lanka war, I remember his first handshake. The hand was soft, the grip delicate and limp. On that occasion in Madras, as he contentedly claimed credit for assassinating the Tamil Mayor of Jaffna and later, the slaughter of 13 Sri Lankan soldiers that ignited the conflict following the anti-Tamil riots of 1983, Velupillai Prabakaran’s dainty handshake seemed in harmony with his soft voice.
A few more meetings and a couple of years later in 1987 — after successfully evading a media ban to reach the frontlines in Jaffna — I found myself reporting in the company of Prabakaran’s ragtag troops in their war against the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF). In the bougainvillea-lined mud tracks, while attempting to photograph his boys gunning down the Indian soldiers in an ambush, I was transfixed by the memory of that handshake as I watched the blood seep from an ill-fated jawan’s head and mingle with the Jaffna dirt.
The other memory is his startled expression when I congratulated him on his newborn towards the end of a long discourse on Eelam. Soon after his fleeting pause, it became clear that he had lost interest in going on and on with his vision of Eelam. He was less voluble, withdrawn and then abruptly left the room. It was left to the master’s voice, Anton Balasingham, to cautiously quiz me on how and what I knew of the addition to his leader’s family.
These two memories define, at any rate for me through all my experiences over the last 25 years in Sri Lanka, the man who has finally destroyed the dream he almost made true. Both the memories give a certain insight into the mind of the man. First, deceive all into believing the contrary about your capabilities — deception is the core of all his strategy. Second, never trust your own shadow — paranoia dictates his behaviour. These traits contributed to the amazing rise — and eventually the astonishing fall — of the leader of the most ruthless terrorist organisation in the world.
To suggest that Prabakaran worked to a master plan in building and shaping his image of invincibility and developing the organisation from a ragtag bunch of boys into the outfit that inspired awe and envy would be to bestow upon him the title of a genius — which he is not. From the beginning, he adopted a twofold strategy — consisting on the one hand of an ‘international political campaign’ by galvanising the diaspora and international opinion in his favour and on the other by bleeding the economy and weakening the state through acts of terror. His success in sustaining the conflict for over a quarter century came from a combination of his own cunning and the lack of purpose, unity and determination in his enemies.

PRABAKARAN ADOPTED A TWOFOLD STRATEGY – GALVANISING THE INTERNATIONAL TAMIL DIASPORA IN HIS FAVOUR AND WEAKENING THE STATE THROUGH ACTS OF TERROR

THE PROPAGANDA CARPET BOMB
“Today we’re engaged in the first war in history — unconventional and irregular as it may be — in an era of e-mails, blogs, cell phones, Blackberries, instant messaging, digital cameras, a global internet with no inhibitions, cell phones, hand-held video cameras, talk radio, 24-hour news broadcasts, satellite television. There’s never been a war fought in this environment before.” That was former US Secretary of State, Donald Rumsfeld in 2005 referring, of course, to his woes stemming from the unnecessary war in Iraq.
If propaganda wins wars, then the IPKF, which saved Sri Lanka from becoming another Lebanon, fell victim to a weapon far more effective than the deadliest conventional weapon in Prabakaran’s jungle arsenal — his propaganda tool, the media.
Central to Prabakaran’s guerilla strategy — over two decades before Rumsfeld made his observation — was a powerful communications network and a sympathetic media. Hence, his exclusive interviews to handpicked influential publications while he was enjoying the hospitality of the Indian government in Madras during the mid-80s, when I first got to shake his hand. From the outset, it was not difficult to win the support of the media, particularly in the West. Prabakaran played his underdog cards adroitly with the help of his advisor Anton Balasingham and his Australianborn wife, Adele and the LTTE’s media headquarters in London.
In November 1986, on the eve of the SAARC summit in Bangalore, the police under instructions from the Chief Minister MG Ramachandran, raided and seized arms and sophisticated communications gear from the assorted Eelam groups operating out of Tamil Nadu. Prabakaran went on a much publicised fast-untodeath in Madras quoting Mahatma Gandhi, whom he said he was emulating in peaceful protest for the return of the equipment. He demanded the immediate return of – not his rocket launchers, SAM missiles and AK-47s — but his lifeline to the world, his wireless sets. By this time, he had the media eating out of his hands and the romanticisation of Prabakaran – already in motion — now entered the process of deification. Everything was returned to him in good order along with a glass of fruit juice that he sipped to declare his victory.

Prabakaran posing with his soldier 'cubs'

With his friend Yogi

Less than a year later, I walked into a scoop in the Jaffna peninsula. IPKF Mi-24 helicopter gunships were on the attack in Chavakachcheri, an LTTE stronghold. People around me were killed, most of them civilians. And my cameras were the only media instruments witnessing the deaths. A week later, when I surfaced in Colombo and rushed to the phone in my hotel room to break the exclusive story, I was dismayed to find that the attack was already the big story in the media. Prabakaran had already beaten me to it — even though there was no electricity to light up his bases in the jungles. Even as the body count in the damaged market area was in progress, his ‘boys’ had radioed their souped-up version of the ‘bombing’ from their jungle hideouts to their ‘media’ headquarters in London from where a telex was sent out to every major international publication. Photographs of death and destruction from an assault during Operation Liberation (or Vadamarachchi Operation) by Sri Lankan gunships six months earlier were circulated as evidence of the Chavakachcheri attack.
The LTTE’s powerful communications network transmitted daily situation reports (sitreps) from Jaffna to its media headquarters in a Western capital where the sitreps were distributed as press releases though telex machines (later with the introduction of fax machines and the internet, it was able to readjust its media budget) to media and governments in Western capitals. Printed material was was a prime means of LTTE propaganda till the early 1990s, when the group went to great expense to publish multilingual and expensively produced four-colour booklets and pamphlets with profuse illustrations. These publications were distributed to the local and international media and select government organisations.
The LTTE’s high degree of familiarity with modern telecommunications enabled it to occupy a very definitive niche in the international public eye, in spite of the fact that it is party to a conflict in a small south Asian nation, largely ignored by the West, and the fact that its acts of violence have impacted only Sri Lanka and occasionally India.
The reason counter-terrorism practitioners began to focus their attention, after 9/11, to Sri Lanka is Prabakaran’s global reach. His group is an integral part of the international terror network. Tactical and technical contagion is a fact of terrorist tactics. From hostage-taking, to hijacking to car-bombs, new methods have been quickly absorbed and copied among terrorist groups worldwide. Witness the Taliban’s use of civilians as human shields during the Pakistani-led assault in Buner district last week.
Years before the world heard of Osama bin Laden or al Qaeda, Prabakaran was pioneering a new method of guerrilla warfare — the suicide bomber. Innovations in the use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and the rampant use of child soldiers and new media technologies — were quickly copied as regular methods of warfare following the invasion of Iraq in 2002.
Prabakaran has successfully operated in volatile environments where his ability to change has been the group’s linchpin not only of effectiveness, but also of survival. While Prabakaran has had ample motivations for change — technological developments, counterterrorism measures, and shifts in people’s reactions to terror attacks — the change has not occurred automatically.

CADRES WERE FED ON A DIET OF ACTION MOVIES. THE THRILL OF ADVENTURE FOR YOUNG RAMBOS- IN-THE-MAKING IS A MESMERISING EXPERIENCE. IT INVESTED POWER THEY COULD NEVER DREAM OF

AS ADAPTIVE AS A CHAMELEON
Prabakaran’s ambition to sever the island in two has been the only constant in his life. Sustaining that for 30 years required a continuous evolution and a firm hand. The practices he adopted were based on selectively chosen models appropriated from a range of religious and political traditions and rituals for a variety of political and publicity goals. The flavor of the 1980s, for him, was Marxist rhetoric. When his oft-repeated desire for a single party socialist government in his imagined Eelam drew gasps of horror, the Lenin portrait in his den was summarily removed and Marx was forsaken in all conversation. He then abandoned ideology to aggressively build the cult around his persona. An adoring media lent as zealous a hand as his followers to help build his cult to mythical proportions — tales of his marksmanship, valour and genius became commonplace. Soon, taking an oath in his name by his cadres, celebrating his birthday, and displaying his portrait everywhere became mandatory. Adele introduced the concept of feminism to recruit girls. In her words, “Nowhere in the world has male chauvinism been eradicated and it certainly has not disappeared from the Tamil society. However the male cadres show a great deal of respect, appreciation and pride in the women combatants’ achievements.” From Hinduism, he borrowed the practice of deifying his martyrs and erecting shrines where people were expected to make offerings and pray on a day designated as holy. Western military traditions provided him a model to build his army while Hollywood, apart from inspiring movies of bravery and heroism, taught him to produce slickly produced audio-visual presentations for profit and for goodwill.

IN HIS OWN IMAGE
Acutely conscious of the power of propaganda and his image as the most lethal weapon in his arsenal, Prabakaran ensured that everybody in his group understood how to use it. Cadres were not to interact with anyone outside the fold. His photograph — and only his — would be the single image that hung on the walls of all denizens in his territory. Every street corner would have his speeches or Eelam national songs playing from the loudspeakers at all hours every day. Every offer of a ride in the Balasingham’s air-conditioned SUV, with Adele at the wheel, in the Jaffna peninsula perforce meant listening to Prabakaran blaring from the only cassette she would insert into the music player.

Prabakaran, Adele and Anton Balasingham in Mullaitivu

Calendars, posters, CDs, DVDs, newspapers, magazines, radio stations, TV stations — he had them all out years before the world had heard of the al Qaeda propaganda machinery. And while the word ‘web’, at any rate for most of us in south Asia in 1993, triggered images of the common house spider, the LTTE had its first website running on the server of a university in the United States. This conveniently coincided with an increasingly unfriendly media following the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi. A computer academy funded and run by professionals from among the diaspora in the Vanni region ensured that the ‘brains trust’ of the LTTE kept abreast with the latest know-how.
A wing of the group (Internet Black Tigers) is credited with the first ever cyber attack (1997) known to the world when it downed the networks of Sri Lankan embassies across the world for a fortnight. In the same year, it was able to hack into a university in the United Kingdom, steal legitimate email IDs and solicit funds for a fictitious hospital in Colombo. And as recently as last week, a group calling itself Kalai Amman Electronic Warfare Unit hacked into the Sri Lanka Army website and defaced its home page. Social network sites were quickly adopted and a search on YouTube yields several hundred videos of the group.
During one of our initial photo sessions (in the early 1980s), Prabakaran was awkward, uncertain of what was expected of him and very receptive to being directed. When it was suggested he change into combat fatigues, he went one further and emerged from the room with his pistol fully loaded. Within seconds, framed by his bodyguards and a huge cut out of a Tiger, with a huge portrait of Lenin in the background, he was in his elements and an hour later eagerly asked for copies of his performance. Several photo sessions later and in Jaffna while fighting for his supremacy against the IPKF, he reveled in playing the role of actor and director with consummate ease. He would tease a twinkle into his eyes with as much ease as a flash of fury. There was bluster in his voice, preparedness in dealing with questions and animation in his conversations but his grip had lost none of its daintiness.
He would play to the gallery with sardonic witticisms, refrain from any response in English, ponder a bit to deliver a quotable quote and strike the pose that struck him as just right for the occasion. In one of his hideouts during the IPKF operations, he called for his leopard cub and while bantering with his friend and deputy, Yogaratnam Yogi, posed gleefully for the camera stroking his pet — much like a prosperous zamindar back from a hunt.
It was essential to his strategy to get the message across that he had a committed following — and that this commitment came from man, woman and child. The cyanide pill was the emblem of commitment — which he generously arranged for me to photograph as his boys gamely posed with them around their necks. (It is another story that while every instance of a cadre biting into the vial during the course of assorted battles captured headlines, there was barely any mention of the many more who threw the vial away for safety).
While Prabakaran majestically posed for the camera with his ‘cubs’ (as he called the children he recruited), there were a few restrictions: He did not like being photographed while satiating his enormous appetite for food. No photographs of his female cadres and none of his dead and dying. These sanctions were lifted after the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi.
Prabakaran quickly developed a media unit – photographers and videographers – which documented every battle and assassination that the group conducted. This served two purposes — as a teaching aid, it came closest to the real thing next to classroom simulations. Besides, it provided archival material for the history books that would be written once Eelam became a reality. This obsession for a visual record proved disastrous for the LTTE — it led the investigators of Rajiv Gandhi’s murder right to its doorstep.

WHILE PRABAKARAN MAJESTICALLY POSED FOR THE CAMERA, THERE WERE A   FEW RESTRICTIONS. HE DID NOT LIKE BEING PHOTOGRAPHED WHILE SATIATING HIS ENORMOUS APPETITE FOR FOOD

Visiting the group’s training camps in the peninsula after Rajiv Gandhi’s murder, the first thing I noticed were the baby-faced boys, some not even in their teens. Their field training began with an oath on their leader: “To achieve Tamil Eelam, my life and soul, all this, I sacrifice. We’ll be very faithful and trustworthy to our elder brother, Mr Prabakaran, the leader of our revolutionary organisation. I now begin my training. The thirst of Tigers is Tamil Eelam.” This was also repeated at the end of the day when their flag was lowered down the mast.
Their history lessons were an endless litany of hatred against the enemy — only comprising rapists, butchers and racists — and the glories of ancient Tamil kingdoms and kings. Classic indoctrination. The classroom instructions centred around battlefield strategies (on a blackboard with a piece of chalk and some war movies), case studies (reconstructed with videos and photographs) from their previous battles and assassinations and finally a film from an extraordinary video collection of B-grade Hollywood action movies. Rambo was the popular choice.
In the prevailing environment of anxiety and hopelessness, Prabakaran was crafty enough to whip up hatred and give a machine gun to his potential recruits among the boys and girls. The romance of the gun, for a teenager fed on a limitless diet of action movies, hatred for the identified enemy, a sense of purpose and an assurance of immortality, is an aphrodisiac far more potent than the promise of seventy-two virgins in paradise.

THE IPKF DEPLETED HIS MANPOWER AND PRABAKARAN HAD TO TURN TO THE GIRLS TO REPLENISH HIS FORCES. THE TASK OF INDUCTING THEM WAS ASSIGNED TO ADELE BALASINGHAM

The thrill of adventure for a 12-year old Rambo-in-the-making is a mesmerising experience. It invests in him power he could never dream of. The only occasion when I accepted their offer of testing a Kalashnikov was instructive. I fired into the horizon across the sea. As we sauntered away feeling like real men after a few rounds, I suddenly froze in horror. I became aware of my posture and swagger, feeling invincible and indestructible — and realized that, despite the stiffness in my shoulder caused by the weapon’s recoil — my arms and legs moved exactly like Rambo, like in the movie I had watched with them in their classroom. If I, a 30-something man of the world, could feel this magical glow of indestructibility shield me from death, it was not difficult to imagine the effect on a 12-year old who knows no other life than the one under Prabakaran’s incantations. The added incentive was that as a cadre, bed and board were provided for on a priority basis in any hamlet that one walked into, brandishing the gun.
If this was not motivation enough, there was then the promise of immortality. Poems and shrines were built in the memory of those who submitted their lives for the cause.

BEHIND THE LINES
One of the essential experiences of embedding yourself with the LTTE was the interaction with the wild-looking boys, bare-footed and ragged. They were your mates, guides and guardians during the tour of the frontlines and combat zones. When you lived alongside them, shared food and experiences under fire, you tended to bond with them. Survival often depended upon this sense of comradeship. Camaraderie, which relaxed their adherence to the strict code of discipline they were sworn to as they pulled out a deck of cards to kill time between attacks, could lead to bias — however much one guarded oneself against it – especially when in skirmishes in the jungle your camera kit and their Kalashnikovs got entangled.
But you never met the same lot ever again. They were either killed before your next trip or rotated to another location. It was rare to learn anything about them through querying the new batch — since each of them operated under a nom de guerre. One looked for a familiar face on the sea of posters and cutouts of martyrs scattered across the peninsula. Likewise, the innumerable shrines that kept multiplying between visits — shrines in honour of the valorous and where people went to pray with their incense sticks and flowers. There would be an odd sighting or two or a rare letter from some family member sharing their grief of their dead son.
Occasionally, a smartly dressed, wellfed stranger would approach you on the street in New York, a wedding in London, a restaurant in Paris or in the shadows of a temple corridor in Thanjavur and identify himself as being a member of the party you accompanied on such and such a trip. Or you would recognise a face in the papers — making the wrong kind of news in a country which had granted him citizenship.

ADELE BALASINGHAM AND THE FREEDOM BIRDS
The Freedom Birds — as the girls were now called — were the ace up Prabakaran’s sleeve. With the IPKF steadily depleting his manpower among the rank and file, Prabakaran had to turn even more to the girls and children to replenish his forces. The task of inducting the girls was assigned to “Auntie” Adele Balasingham. Girls, at this point, were banded together as the Students Organisation of Liberation Tigers (SOLT) and were used in peripheral roles as befitted their status in Jaffna society – in servitude, ushering in crowds at an event, distributing pamphlets, reciting poems extolling the greatness of their National Leader or singing paeans in honour of a recent suicide bomber. Adele’s task was made easy by the prevailing oppressive caste and class system and the alleged atrocities of the IPKF. She offered the guarantee of emancipating the girls from the traditional role of Tamil women by fighting shoulder to shoulder with the boys in pursuit of their freedom. A few months after the murder of Rajiv Gandhi, during a conversation in Jaffna, she would proudly claim: “The most historic development for the Jaffna woman in recent years is her confidence.”
Following the death, by cancer in 2007, of her husband Anton Balasingham, the self-described theoretician, chief negotiator and political advisor to Prabakaran, Adele continues to actively work for her leader quietly and away from the media glare from her base in London.

Adel Balasingham with the freedom birds

THE DEPUTIES
Gopalaswamy Mahendraraja, better known by his nom de guerre Mahathaya, Prabakaran’s extremely popular deputy, could have easily been mistaken for Prabakaran by anyone whose only awareness of the LTTE leaders was based on a perfunctory glance at media photographs. They were built alike and sprouted thick moustaches. In Prabakaran’s presence, Mahathaya was almost hunched in servility, respectful and barely uttering a word until spoken to. His transformation on the battlefield, however, was amazing.

YEARS BEFORE THE WORLD HEARD OF OSAMA BIN LADEN OR AL-QAEDA, PRABAKARAN WAS PIONEERING A NEW METHOD OF GUERRILLA WARFARE – THE SUICIDE BOMBER

Mahathaya’s silence was compensated by Yogi‘s loud voice. It was with Yogi that Prabakaran seemed to share an easy relationship. Laughing and joking over a Chinese lunch, the two seemed to be best buddies. Yogi strutted with his convent-educated English — much in the manner of a subordinate who wants to appear as an equal in the presence of people he seeks to impress; Mahathaya was diffident and respectful in the presence of authority, his leader. On the battlefield, as I joined the motley bunch Mahathaya led against the advancing army, I could barely associate him with the deputy who almost scraped in servility in the presence of his boss. Yogi was the well-scrubbed, smooth and oily politician, Mahathaya the dutiful and popular army commander.
When Mahathaya marched into Trincomalee at the head of a big army of freshly uniformed cadres along with Yogi to watch the back of the last IPKF soldier disappear from view in March 1990, they took to the podium to thank the big crowds the LTTE had corralled at the town’s stadium. Yogi included the media in his thanksgiving and singled out a couple of us by name as those who had fought as much as they for their struggle. Barely over a year later, with Rajiv murdered and the investigation clearly pointing to the LTTE as his killers, Yogi’s first reaction upon greeting me in Jaffna was a bitter utterance of “yellow journalist” accompanied by a ferocious mouthful of spit at me, while Balasingham and Adele watched in grim silence. World opinion was beginning to weigh heavily against them. Their nerves were clearly on edge.
Prabakaran denied any role in the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi and instead set into motion an elaborate exercise to disprove Dhanu’s (Rajiv Gandhi’s killer) link with the LTTE. Meetings were set up with her ‘parents’, neighbours, and ‘friends’ all over the peninsula. At the end of the long day, after a snack of hot vadas at their thatched roof headquarters near Jaffna town, when my increasing skepticism of their charade began to get the better of their gentle persuasiveness, Balasingham and Yogi pushed back their chairs and declared the meeting over. The parting shot was as astounding as it was petty — pay for the vadas you just ate. When I awoke the next morning, the bicycle I depended on to traverse the peninsula was gone. Their fabled public relations machinery was beginning to crack and yet unknown to the world, trouble was brewing within.
A year later, in a move that stunned his followers, Prabakaran struck against Mahathaya who he had anointed as his deputy during the war against the IPKF in 1987. Accusing him of treachery and collaborating with the Indians against him, Prabakaran placed Mahathaya in custody, liquidated most of Mahathaya’s troops and decisively crushed a potential rival to his supremacy as leader. Mahathaya was executed after a prolonged period of torture in December 1994. Yogi, whose loyalty too came under suspicion, was consigned to the doghouse to expect a similar fate. After years in anxious oblivion, he reappeared as head of the LTTE’s History Division on Black Tigers Day, the commemoration of suicide bombers, in July 2006. He spoke on the occasion and asked, “Weren’t bombs made to blow up and kill men? So why is there such a cry when only a man becomes a human bomb?” He was subsequently rehabilitated to his current position as military advisor in the Vanni. Balasingham and his wife Adele rose even more higher in their leader’s estimate. The Balasinghams — who posed no threat of any sort to their master — became the face of the organisation across Western capitals and were an essential part of all negotiating teams at various times.

Continued…….